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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE POLICY RATIONALE 
FOR A CHILD SUPPORT DEDUCTION 
Bobby Brown, the once famous R&B singer, is the new symbol of 
the deadbeat dad, having been arrested several times for failing to pay 
child support.1  Could the tax system be used to help fathers like Brown 
meet their obligations?  Would this be a wise redistribution of public 
assets?  Would this be helpful to children?  This Article addresses these 
questions. 
Children are our future, literally.  We profess this sentiment in our 
songs,2 evidencing, among other things, its universality in our collective 
consciousness.  “The duty of parents to provide shelter and sustenance to 
their dependents . . . [is one of the] most fundamental and necessitous 
known to society, both animal and human.”3  The evidence suggests that 
we are falling short on our obligations to children.  While the United 
States spends $8 billion per month fighting which many deem an 
unpopular war in Iraq,4 tardy child support payments also tally in the 
 1. See Judge Orders Bobby Brown Arrested, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2006-10-02-bobby-brown-arrest-warrant_x.htm 
[hereinafter Brown Arrested]. 
 2. See DANNY ADLERMAN & KIM ADLERMAN, SONGS FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN 
(2002). 
 3. CAROLE A. CHAMBERS, CHILD SUPPORT: HOW TO GET WHAT YOUR CHILD 
NEEDS AND DESERVES 11 (1991) (quoting Justice Richard J. Huttner, New York State 
Supreme Court) [hereinafter CAROLE CHAMBERS].  As the title of the book suggests, 
this is a self-help book for the custodial parent looking to get child support from the 
non-custodial parent.  The book has some very good suggestions for the custodial 
parent, such as reminders that she is to put her feelings aside and focus on her children’s 
needs.  However, some of the recommendations, such as when determining how much 
your child needs “this is not the time to underestimate expenses,” can be misinterpreted. 
See id. at 20-21; see also Martha Minow, How Should We Think About Child Support 
Obligations?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT 302, 305 (Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998).  Minow summarizes the duty of 
parents by quoting William Blackstone: 
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of 
natural law; an obligation . . . laid on them not only by nature herself but by their own 
proper act, in bringing them into the world; for they would be in the highest manner 
injurious to their issue; if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards 
see them perish. 
Id. 
 4. See Andrew Taylor, Senate Approves $70 Billion For War Spending, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 29, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/ 
a/2006/09/29/national/w074740d20.dtl. 
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billions.5  Failure to pay child support, called the largest single crime in 
America,6 and noted as one of the most pervasive acts of civil 
disobedience since prohibition and the anti-drug laws, persists.7  An 
estimated 75% to 87% of children in single parent households receive no 
financial support from their non-custodial parent.8  The scope of the 
problem is elucidated by the shocking fact that half of our nation’s 
children, at some point in the next decade, will be eligible to receive 
child support.9
The United States is facing a real crisis regarding child support.  To 
borrow an analogy from U.S. Sen. Barack Obama, although this may be 
a “quiet” crisis,10 it is nevertheless real and painful to millions of 
women, children, and men.  Public action started in earnest in the 1980s 
when the federal government began to crack down on parents who do 
not make their mandated payments.11  Congress encouraged similar 
 5. CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 17 (claiming an arrearage of $4 billion 
annually as of 1984). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See William S. Comanor, Child Support Payments: A Review of Current 
Policies, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 1, 2 (William S. 
Comanor ed., 2004) [hereinafter Comanor, Review of Current Policies]. 
 8. CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 17. 
 9. See IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT—AN EXTENSION OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY 18 (1992) [hereinafter GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT].  According to 
the author, the current divorce rates and the growing rate of out of wedlock births 
support this claim.  Another commentator notes that with one out of every four children 
being born out of wedlock, the problem is only getting worse.  The commentator 
provides some sobering statistics, such as 25% of custodial parents who were not 
married at the time of their children’s birth obtained child support orders and 75% of 
custodial parents who were married to non-custodial parents at the time of their 
children’s births received child support orders. See SIMONE SPENCE, DEADBEATS: WHAT 
RESPONSIBLE PARENTS NEED TO KNOW 15 (2001). 
 10. Cf. Roland S. Martin, Obama’s “Quiet Riots” Are For Real, June 11, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/06/07/martin/index.html (discussing Sen. Obama’s 
speech regarding the “burning anger” among poor African-Americans in the United 
States, and warning the Bush Administration that it is ignoring the “quiet riots” that are 
occurring in these communities). 
 11. See MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL & JOEL FRIEDMAN, DEADBEAT DADS—A 
NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT SCANDAL 10 (1996).  This marked a change from the hands-
off approach of the 1950s to the moral outrage of the 1980s. See id.  Other reasons for 
this shift in attitude include the rise of the women’s movement and “the conservative 
anti-welfare administrations of the 1980s.” Id.  “The greatest influence, however, is the 
reality that the ever increasing burden on state and federal social programs require[d] a 
change in policy.” Id. 
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crackdowns at the state level by threatening to reduce federal 
subsidies.12  This effort has extended to all segments of the population, 
including some celebrities.13  In one high profile case, the irresponsible 
father went so far as to murder someone in order to shirk his fatherly 
duties.14
This Article does not eschew the term “deadbeat dad” in favor of 
more politically correct nomenclature (e.g., “deadbeat parent”), because 
the evidence still shows that the non-custodial parent of children 
indebted with child support payments remains, in large part, the father of 
the child.15  Yet, there exists another side to the story.  The reality of the 
 12. See id.  As an incentive, the federal government pays for 66% of the states’ 
operating costs and 90% of all information technology and genetic testing expenses. 
JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 40 (2003).  
The federal government has used such tactics in the past to coerce states to follow their 
lead.  Another example is the use of federal highway funds to coerce states to increase 
the legal drinking age to 21. 
 13. See Brown Arrested, supra note 1.  A famous deadbeat dad and poster child for 
this group has been Bobby Brown. See id.  The former R&B singer who was married to 
Whitney Houston has seen his share of troubles for failing to pay child support. See id.  
He has been threatened with incarceration and has even been incarcerated for failing to 
pay child support. See id.  Media reports of middle to high income fathers refusing to 
pay their child support payments have created the stereotypical deadbeat dad. Cf. id.  
Unwillingness to pay child support, however, is only one reason for non-payments. See 
THEODORA OOMS & JENNIFER WEINREB, REDUCING FAMILY POVERTY AND CHILD TAX-
BASED STRATEGIES 11 (The Family Impact Seminar 1992).  There are other reasons, 
such as lack of income. See id.  Nevertheless, claims that there is often no connection 
between non-payment of child support and lack of income persist. See CAROLE 
CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 19. 
 14. See Dave Andrusko, Rae Carruth Convicted in Murder of Pregnant Girlfriend, 
NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Feb. 2001, available at http://www.nrlc.org/news/2001/N 
RL02/carruth.html.  An extreme case of a deadbeat dad-to-be involves Rae Carruth, a 
former professional football player. See id.  Unable to convince his pregnant girlfriend 
to have an abortion, Mr. Carruth conspired to have her killed, and succeeded. See id.  
He is currently serving an 18-year sentence in a North Carolina prison. Id. 
 15. Cf.  Frank J. Furstenberg, Jr., Dealing with Dads: The Changing Roles of 
Fathers, in ESCAPE FROM POVERTY: WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN 189, 
196 (P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995).  In most cases, the 
mother is given custody of the children. Id.  A 1989 survey shows that “close to 90% of 
children from divorced families initially are in the custody of their mothers.” Id.  After 
two years, contact with their father drops off considerably. Id.  A more recent survey in 
1998 shows that fathers make up 18% of all single parents. Ronald K. Henry, Child 
Support Policy and the Unintended Consequences of Good Intentions, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 128, 138 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004).  
Gender biases, however, are not easily erased and there is a continuing gender bias 
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deadbeat dad might not be that repulsive.  He has been described in 
more human terms as a man trying to make the best of a bad situation,16 
as contemporary literature begins to debunk the myth of the deadbeat 
dad.17  Some have argued that the current legal system of child support 
enforcement is responsible for creating the deadbeat dad.18  The unique 
American family law system at the state level often bifurcates the rights 
and responsibilities of parents.19  The custodial parent is assigned the 
right of custody but often bears none of the financial responsibility to 
support the children, as that responsibility is assigned to the non-
custodial parent who is denied the right to participate in the lives of the 
children.20  Some experts in the field have advanced the above reasoning 
as the cause for this large scale civil disobedience.21
Clearly, some fathers deserve the “deadbeat dad” moniker.  One 
popular image is, for instance, those fathers who drive luxury cars while 
their children starve.22  This, however, is not the norm.  The average 
father is responsible and wants to do the right thing, but there are strong 
forces against him, like the inability to pay.23  Survey after survey shows 
against fathers in custody determination. Id. 
 16. See infra notes 105-10. 
 17. See generally JOHN CONINE, FATHERS’ RIGHTS: THE SOURCEBOOK FOR 
DEALING WITH THE CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM (1989) (discussing how fathers are often 
unjustly classified as deadbeat dads); EARL JOHNSON ET AL., FATHERS’ FAIR SHARE: 
HELPING POOR MEN MANAGE CHILD SUPPORT AND FATHERHOOD (1999) (discussing 
alternative methods of encouraging fathers to pay child support as opposed to the 
traditional punitive enforcement methods which vilify deadbeat dads). 
 18. Henry, supra note 15, at 139. (arguing that government policy must be 
examined as the culprit because “[w]e do not have a problem with large numbers of 
parents who refuse to provide for their children during an intact marriage, yet those 
same responsible parents become ‘deadbeats’ upon divorce”). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. OOMS & WEINREB, supra note 13, at 9.  Non-custodial fathers are seen as “a 
homogeneous group, at least in terms of their ability to pay.” Irwin Garfinkel et al., 
Introduction to FATHERS UNDER FIRE 1, 6 (Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
Garfinkel, Introduction].  “Hence the term ‘deadbeat dad’ is applied indiscriminately to 
all nonpaying fathers” regardless of the reason for nonpayment. Garfinkel, Introduction, 
supra, at 6.  The truth, however, is that while some fathers have the ability to pay but 
refuse, some fathers simply cannot afford to pay. See id. 
 23. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 162-63. This is the position that is being 
advocated by fathers’ rights groups.  They argue that the country’s “monomaniacal zeal 
to catch and punish deadbeat dads has produced a child support enforcement system 
inherently inequitable and unjust to fathers.” Id. at 162.  The role of the father is, thus, 
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that custodial mothers report that the reason for lack of payment from 
the non-custodial father is that “he can’t pay.”24  Nevertheless, the 
authorities blindly continue to enforce child support payment debts and, 
in some cases, enforce them by imprisonment;25 in situations where the 
mother receives public aid, federal and state governments will provide 
the child support payment to the mother and hold the father indebted to 
the government for that amount.26  In cases where the mother is not 
dependent on welfare, the government has largely stayed out of the 
fray.27
To deal with its new role as creditor, the federal government 
created the Office of Child Support Enforcement (“OCSE”) to enforce 
child support payments.  By its own estimation, the OCSE has been 
wildly successful.28  Independent critics, however, demur, accusing the 
office of cooking its books.29  These claims will be analyzed later.  
Clearly, though, the child support crisis remains a major sociological 
problem and is intensifying as the number of single-parent households 
rises.  This Article proposes a solution—provide a positive financial 
incentive to the non-custodial parent to make payments. 
Psychologists tell us that to ensure success in modifying behavior, a 
“carrot and stick approach” is needed.30  In the child support arena, the 
reduced to one dimension, that of an economic provider. Id.  Over time, this weakens 
the father-child bond. Id. 
 24. See Henry, supra note 15, at 155.  A 1992 survey of the General Accountability 
Office (GAO) shows that 66% of custodial mothers listed this as the reason they are not 
getting support from their father’s child. See id.  But see OOMS & WEINREB, supra note 
13, at 11 (claiming smaller numbers). 
 25. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 85. 
 26. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 39.  Welfare mothers must assign their support 
rights to the state, and any support that the state collects on their behalf from their 
former partners goes back to the state. Id. at 42. 
 27. Id.  With regard to welfare mothers, they are required by law to register in their 
states’ child support programs. Id.  Non-welfare mothers can take advantage of such 
programs but do not have to. See id. 
 28. See Henry, supra note 15, at 128.  According to its own data, the OCSE spent 
$3 billion in 2000 and reported a cost effectiveness of $3.95, meaning that it recovered 
$3.95 for every dollar it spent. Id. 
 29. Id. at 129.  
 30. Cf. Chennai M. Selvarajamani, What is the Meaning and Origin of “Carrot 
and Stick Approach?,” THE HINDU, Sept. 16, 2003, http://www.hindu.com/br/2003/09/1 
6/stories/2003091600250300.htm.  The carrot and stick approach has been credited to 
owners of donkeys who would dangle a carrot on the nose of the donkeys to keep them 
moving. See id.  If this strategy did not work, then the stick would be used to strike the 
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government has used the “stick” approach for the past three decades, 
with arguably little success.31  It might be time to adopt a carrot 
approach.  The stick must be retained to address those who will only 
respond to the coercive power of the state.  For the vast majority, 
positive incentives can be created to push them into the correct behavior. 
One of the easiest and least costly ways of ensuring greater 
discharge of child support obligations is to permit a tax deduction for the 
payor.  Coupled with an inclusion in the income of the payee parent, the 
government would lose little tax revenue because: (1) the number of 
women earning compensate wages to their male counterparts is rising, 
thus, decreasing the tax distortion of a deduction/inclusion regime; and 
(2) the number of men gaining custody of their children is also rising.  
Moreover, tax revenue might increase, on balance, through a reduction 
in administrative costs.32
More importantly, because it has been recognized that there is a 
direct correlation between payment of child support and participation in 
a child’s life,33 such an incentive has the added benefit of keeping or 
reintroducing the father in the lives of his children.  This would have 
important sociological consequences, especially in the Latino and 
African-American communities where participation of fathers in the 
lives of their children has been reported to be much lower than that of 
other communities.34
animal. See id. 
 31. Cf. Irwin Garfinkel & Sara McLanahan, The Effects of Child Support Reform 
on Child Well-Being, in ESCAPE FROM POVERTY: WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR 
CHILDREN 211, 222 (P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995) 
(discussing the effects of numerical guidelines used to ascertain and preserve adequate 
levels of child support).  Between 1978 and 1985, “the average real value of child 
support payments has decreased by 25%.” Id. 
 32. See Henry, supra note 15, at 128 (indicating that if child support payments are 
voluntarily made, the need for the OCSE would be eliminated or greatly diminished, 
potentially saving the government—federal and state—$4.5 billion that it is currently 
spending on child support enforcement). 
 33. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 17.  “A parent who is able to 
maintain a meaningful relationship with his children is simply more likely to keep up 
with his financial obligations.” Id. at x. 
 34. See ROBERT JOSEPH TAYLOR ET AL., FAMILY LIFE IN BLACK AMERICA 15-17 
(1997).  According to statistics reported in the late 1990s, only 33.1% of black children 
live with both parents as opposed to 75.9% of white children and 66.1% of Hispanic 
children. Id. at 15.  As a consequence, while only 16.2% of white children live in 
poverty, 41.9% of all black children are poor. Id. at 17.  Making matters worse, the 
poverty of black children appears chronic. See id. 
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Both tax and non-tax commentators have proposed variations on the 
child support deduction theme.35  Revenue-oriented schemes normally 
concern the technicalities of the tax system, such as whether the Internal 
Revenue Code (“IRC”) would permit this type of deduction—it is a 
“personal deduction”—or whether the payee parent can receive a 
deduction for non-payment of child support.36  Non-tax commentators, 
on the other hand, mostly analyze the sociological aspect of this debate 
and address the economic and tax aspects of the debate only in passing.  
This proposal bridges the gap by marrying the sociological aspects of 
child support debate with the technicalities of the tax laws.  
Additionally, this Article will argue the theoretical rationale justifying 
such a deduction on policy grounds,37 and will employ the traditional 
process of evaluating good tax laws: whether it is equitable, efficient and 
simple, essentially addressing whether the proposal is good tax law.38
Part II outlines the history of the problem of non-payment of child 
support and the evolution of remedial measures.  Part III proposes a 
series of related solutions to the problem, namely setting realistic child 
support payments in conjunction with permitting a deduction for such 
payments.  Part IV discusses tax deductions in the context of the typical 
 35. See, e.g., Irwin Garfinkel et al., Child Support and Child Well-being: What 
Have We Learned?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 1, 23 (Irwin Garfinkel 
et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Garfinkel, What Have We Learned] (calling for an assured 
child support benefit—a new form of social security benefit to serve as a backup for 
private support); GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 9 (same); Laura 
Bigler, A Change is Needed: The Taxation of Alimony and Child Support, 48 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 361 (2000) (calling for a deduction for child support payments); Deborah H. 
Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. 
REV. 121, 162 (1989) (arguing that all payments to ex-spouses should be treated as 
alimony payments unless the parties otherwise agree to a contrary treatment); Wendy 
Gerzog Shaller, On Policy Grounds, A Limited Tax Credit For Child Support and 
Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX. POL’Y 321 (1994) (calling for a limited tax credit for alimony 
and child support payments); ABA Delegates Adopt Resolution to Equalize Child 
Support, Alimony Treatment, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 154 (Aug. 11, 1989) (calling 
for legislation to include all family support payments—including child support—in 
income of payee and provide a deduction to payor). 
 36. See William A. Klein, Tax Effects of Nonpayment of Child Support, 45 TAX L. 
REV. 259 (1990). 
 37. But see Shaller, supra note 35, at 321. 
 38. Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions In The Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation 
And Presumptions For The Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656, 668 (2007) (quoting 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 27-31 (5th 
ed. 2005)). 
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deadbeat dad dilemma, focusing on government expenditure, tax 
arbitrage,39 and the societal pressures of non-payment. 
II.  THE PROBLEMS OF CHILD SUPPORT 
 
A.  History of Child Support in the United States 
Today, fathers make most child support payments because mothers 
usually have custody of children.40  However, this trend is rapidly 
changing, as more judges are granting joint41 and sole custody to 
fathers.42  To most people, granting custody automatically to the mother 
seems natural because she is perceived as the more nurturing parent and 
hence, most able to raise children.43  This has not always been the case.  
In early America, the children stayed with their father if parents 
divorced.44  Some attribute this to the prevalent culture at the time, 
which by definition is a set of internalized values.45  Thus, attributing 
 39. See generally Walter Adams Looney III, Essays on Tax and Social Policy (May 
2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file at Harvard 
University and with author) (expounding an in-depth analysis of tax arbitrage in the 
family support area).  Tax arbitrage is generally seen as an inefficient use of economic 
resources.  It is the notion of allocating resources based on tax consequences and not 
based on the best economic use. Id.  In the child support arena, parents exchange child 
tax exemption, deductions and credits for higher child support payments. 
 40. See Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 196. 
 41. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 89-91 (reporting that courts are 
moving more toward recommending that parents share custody because this is generally 
better for the child). 
 42. See Henry, supra note 15, at 138.  A 2004 survey found that 18% of single 
parents are men, an increase of 25% over the previous three years. Id. 
 43. BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 87.  There are also historical reasons 
why the mother is normally assigned the role of caretaker.  Fewer women were 
employed outside the home and men did not generally participate in the day-to-day care 
of children. Id.  Now, women are firmly established in the labor force and have closed 
in on the wage disparity, so their perception as caretaker has changed. 
 44. See Henry, supra note 15, at 138 (discussing an “early feminist meeting . . . in 
1848 . . . [that] included the fact that fathers automatically received custody of children 
as a principal complaint,” mostly because they needed the help of the children on the 
farm); SPENCE, supra note 9, at xiv (claiming that up until the nineteenth century, 
fathers were usually awarded custody of children because, since women did not work 
outside the marriage, they could not afford to take care of children).  The two authors 
have slightly different reasons why men were allowed custody, but both reasons are 
grounded on economics. 
 45. See THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (revised ed. 1980) (defining 
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some sociological event to culture begs the question.  The answer lies in 
the economics of the time.  Prior to the industrial revolution, the 
economy of the United States was primarily agrarian.  As titular head of 
the family, the father needed as much help as he could get on the farm.  
As a result, society in the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries 
emphasized “the father’s centrality in raising the children and preparing 
them for the adult world.”46  As the industrial revolution progressed, 
fathers tended to work outside the homestead.47  Henceforth, the image 
of the father settled into that of the “external wage-earner,” with the 
mother as “home-bound nurturer,”48 giving rise to the “cult of 
motherhood” and the “tender years doctrine” of the early twentieth 
century.49
During these times, child support payment orders were rare, owing 
to the fact that parents were only charged with providing a home for 
their children.50  Further, the divorce rate was extremely low due to both 
the economically devastating costs of divorce and enormous social 
pressure against the dissolution of marriage.51  As we will see later, 
there were also legal impediments to granting child support.52  In the 
culture as the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings and 
transmitted from one generation to another). 
 46. Henry, supra note 15, at 138. 
 47. See P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Maris A. Vinovskis, Whose Responsibility? 
An Historical Analysis of the Changing Roles of Mothers, Fathers & Society, in ESCAPE 
FROM POVERTY: WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN 11, 15 (P. Lindsay Chase-
Lansdale & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995) (“[T]he father remained the head of the 
household and was responsible for the education and well-being of the children.  In 
practice, [his] direct role in family life diminished . . . as his place of work became 
separated from home.”). 
 48. Henry, supra note 15, at 138.  Other reasons have been cited for this change.  In 
the Puritan homes of mid-seventeenth century New England, the father was the early 
educator of the children owing to church pressure and his own educational superiority 
in the household. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 47, at 13.  This role of 
educator was transferred to the mother due to the sudden and unexpected drop in church 
attendance by Puritan men. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 47, at 13. 
 49. Henry, supra note 15, at 138. 
 50. See id. at 138-39. 
 51. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 57-59.  Upon marriage, all of a woman’s 
assets were transferred to her husband.  The early settlers also brought with them from 
England “the most strictly interpreted traditional and religious ideas concerning the 
sanctity of marital vows.” Id.  
 52. See CROWLEY, supra note 12. 
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case of death of one or both parents, close relatives provided support to 
the children.53
In the early twentieth century, there was a “reorientation of welfare 
policy toward children,”54 which entailed a shift “premised on the belief 
that the mother-child relationship was fundamental and sacred and that 
home life should be encouraged and strengthened.”55  Evidence also 
suggests that a precursor to our current welfare system was the attempt 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to assist “poor 
children in their own homes.”56  Some states made early efforts to 
criminalize the non-payment of child support.57  In most states, 
however, these new criminal laws were only enforced in cases where 
destitute children were victimized.58  More comprehensive enforcement 
of the child support laws was still a few decades away. 
1.  Federal Government Involvement 
The record of federal government’s involvement in supporting 
children extends back to the end of the Civil War.  It established the 
Freedman’s Bureau to support the newly freed blacks and created black 
schools, particularly in the South.59  The federal government also 
provided pensions for “disabled Union soldiers or their widows and 
dependent children.”60
Although the federal government spent large sums on these and 
other efforts, it did not begin to gain a more central role in welfare and 
child support until after the Depression with the passage of the Social 
Security Act and Aid to Dependent Children Act.61  By the 1960s, the 
 
 53. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 47, at 17 (stating that close 
relatives were expected to help children in need, although increasingly indigent families 
and individuals relied on private and public charity). 
 54. Id. at 19. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 31. 
 57. See id. at 20. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 18. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 22. 
Aid to Dependent Children program was intended to cover all needy children in 
single-mother households, states restricted assistance by insisting that children had to 
live in a ‘suitable’ home.  Children of African-American or never-married mothers 
were particularly singled out unfairly for exclusion from the program. 
Id. 
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federal government assumed the central role.  The father, in theory, 
remained the party responsible for the well-being of his children, but 
few enforcement efforts were made against him.  The last twenty years 
witnessed an explosion in child support enforcement spurred on, in part, 
by the bi-partisan Family Support Act of 1988.62  The Act reflected 
changes in society’s views about child support and greater emphasis on 
the responsibility of fathers.  The greater share of responsibility was 
advocated as far back as 1949 when former president Gerald Ford 
introduced a bill (H.R. 4580) on that score as a congressman.63
Importantly, the stronger penalties urged by the Act did not produce 
the desired results.64  This stems from Congress’ failure to address the 
reasons for fathers’ non-compliance, which are diverse and complex.  
Additionally, as this Article argues, in many cases, there is simply no 
financial incentive to pay child support. 
2.  Greater Focus on Fathers 
The bifurcation of rights and responsibilities discussed above also 
made it easier for advocates to convince the public that more financial 
support was needed from fathers.  A popular book added fuel to the fire, 
“claim[ing] that, after divorce, women’s standard of living declined by 
73% while men’s standard of living increased by 42%.”65  Despite being 
wrong, and acknowledged as such by the author herself, these figures 
“have been convenient for advocates and have become ingrained in both 
the popular culture and academic circles.”66
As one might expect, politics have played and continue to play a 
major role in shaping child support policy.  From the early 1900s to the 
 
 62. Pub. L. No. 100-485 (1988). See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 47, 
at 25-27.  The Family Support Act was a watershed event in the child support collection 
arena.  It was the result of the efforts of Pres. Reagan and Sen. Daniel Patrick Monihan, 
who had interest in stronger child support efforts. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, 
supra note 47, at 25. 
 63. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 95. 
 64. Noted commentator Irwin Garfinkel wrote in 1998 that despite twenty years of 
increasingly strong legislation—a time span that included the Act—child support 
collections had not shown much improvement. See Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 
22, at 3. 
 65. Henry, supra note 15, at 140 (citing LENORE WEIZMAN, THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION—THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN 
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985)). 
 66. Id. 
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1960s, social workers largely shaped the child support debate.67  “They 
proposed offering mothers who received Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children much more than cash assistance to support their 
children . . . and direct[ed] them to all of the in-kind benefits for which 
they qualified, [including] job training and educational programs.”68  In 
the 1970s, the social workers lost control in favor of conservatives,69  
who brought enforcement of child support to the forefront “with a single 
focus: welfare cost recovery.”70  As the number of female legislators 
grew in the 1980s,71 we saw a change of focus back toward the family.  
Not only did strong enforcement of child support obligations for families 
on welfare continue, but coverage expanded to non-welfare families.72  
In the case of non-welfare families, financial support was sent directly to 
the family, instead of going through the state’s hands first.73
Today, it is not clear who is at the helm.74  We are seeing an 
increase of advocacy on behalf of fathers, which reflects greater concern 
for the father, including “forgiveness for arrears,” more equitable child 
support guidelines, and “a revamping of all state award formulas to 
reflect the true cost of child rearing.”75  It appears that some states are 
already responding to these concerns.76  While it is unclear where the 
 67. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 28. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. at 29. 
 71. See id. at 28. 
 72. Id. at 30. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 12-204 (West 2007).  Maryland has a 
child support scheme that holds both parents responsible based on their adjusted annual 
incomes. See id. at § 12-204(a).  Maryland provides a table much like a tax table, 
mandating a level of expected child expenditures depending on the parents’ income. See 
id. at § 12-204(e).  Each parent is responsible to pay an amount based on his/her 
percentage of the parents’ combined income. See id. at § 12-204(a)(1).  Adjustments are 
made if certain child expenses are paid solely by one parent; adjustments are also made 
for the amount of time the child spends in each parent’s home. See id. at § 12-204(m).  
Finally, the calculation of child support is subject to court review.  Even if one parent 
does not work (unless physically or mentally unable to work), the Maryland scheme 
assigns income to the non-working parent based on prior work history, availability of 
jobs in the area, etc. See id. at § 12-204(b).  An example of how the Maryland approach 
works follows: Father and Mother divorce; they each make $5000 per month.  They 
have one child who stays with the mother full-time.  Based on their combined income, 
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law will eventually settle on this issue, the pendulum appears to be 
swinging back to the middle. 
3.  The American Legal System 
The American legal system has had to adjust to changes in societal 
attitudes toward welfare and child support.  Because there was no legal 
underpinning for child support in the English system, it was said that the 
American justice system had to “invent the common law notion of child 
support.”77  Apparently, “English law [only] provided . . . that all 
parents should support their children, [and that] no third party—
including a mother—could attempt to collect money from her former 
spouse to help her raise her children.”78  This was in essence the concept 
of joint and several liability.  If both parents are responsible to support 
their children, when one parent discharges their responsibility they 
forfeit their right to sue for compensation. 
The courts first changed their views by recognizing the right of a 
third-party benefactor to sue a father79 for necessities that the benefactor 
provided to a dependent, so long as the benefactor proved that the father 
failed to provide such resources.80  The benefactor could be a relative, a 
family friend, or a merchant.81  Once this principle was laid out, it was 
 
the expected combined amount of child support would be $1040.  See id. at § 12-204(e).  
They would share this amount equally—$520 each.  Hence, the non-custodial father 
would have to pay the custodial mother $520 per month.  Based on his hypothetical 
income, this is a reasonable amount.  If they shared joint custody, neither would be 
liable for child support payments to the other. 
Thirty-three states use the Maryland or income share approach.  Fourteen use a flat 
percentage of the non-custodial parent’s income.  Three states use what has been called 
the Melson formula.  Under this formula, an amount of money set at the poverty limit is 
set aside from the payor’s income before child support is deducted.  This way, the payor 
will not dip below the poverty line due to child support obligations. SPENCE, supra note 
9, at 10-13. 
 77. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 54. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 55.  The early law emphasized the responsibilities of the father due to 
the doctrine of coverture, under which the husband was the lord of the manor and 
personified the entire marital relationship. See id. at 57.  This also meant that the 
husband was responsible for the financial well-being of his children. See id. 
 80. Id. at 55. 
 81. Id.  An early case so providing is Van Valkinburgh v. Watson & Watson, 13 
Johns. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816), which involved a suit brought by a merchant to 
recover the cost of a coat purchased by a child on his father’s credit.  Although the 
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an easy step to extend it to a former spouse.82  Today, there is no 
question that a custodial parent can sue the non-custodial parent for 
failure to pay child support. 
B.  The Rise of the Deadbeat Dad 
As the mood of the country turned in the 1970s, the emphasis 
changed from helping the abandoned woman and child to making the 
unsupporting father pay.  A new moniker was needed because Gerald 
Ford’s “runaway pappy”83 of the 1950s would not work for the 1970s.  
The proponents of stronger enforcement needed a battle cry that would 
capture their frustrations.  Hence, the “deadbeat dad” was born, 
signaling a renewed vigor by the government to chase these men who 
were avoiding their responsibilities.  Use of the term was politically 
effective because it instantly painted a negative picture of the non-
custodial father.84
Over the past few decades, we have been experiencing a war 
against the deadbeat dad, with penalties including felony charges, non-
renewal or revocation of professional licenses, jail time,85  and even 
father was found not liable because he had been supporting his children, the case laid 
the important principle that “a parent is under a natural obligation to furnish necessaries 
for his infant children” and will be liable if such necessities were provided by a third 
party. See id. (citing Van Valkinburgh, 13 Johns. 480). 
 82. See Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J. Eq. 512 (N.J. Ch. 1858).  This case involved 
a lawsuit brought by a mother against the estate of her ex-husband for the husband’s 
failure to support their children in their prior marriage. See id.  The court held that “a 
parent is bound to provide his infant children with necessaries; and if he neglect[s] to do 
so,” a third party could recover from the parent. Id. at 517. See also CROWLEY, supra 
note 12, at 67 (discussing that the principle was not immediately applied to African-
Americans).  Because of this, African-American fathers, for a long time, did not have to 
fear enforcement of the child support laws. See id.  This is partially attributed to 
slavery, when the white owner was the head of household for his slaves.  After slavery 
ended, there was legal ambivalence as to who was the head of the household. See id.  
The main reason appears to be the prejudice felt against black children—they were not 
seen as “worth the bother and expense of a legal pursuit.” Id. 
 83. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 73. 
 84. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE 
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 14 (2005) (discussing the effective use of 
labels in politics, citing as examples the pejorative use of the term “liberal” and the use 
of “death tax” by opponents of the estate tax). 
 85. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 331 (stating that “as a significant part of his 
program, Pres. Clinton [had] declared war on those who [did] not meet their child 
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offers of government sponsored vasectomies.86  Proponents of these 
harsh punishments argued that the father living alone saw a drastic 
improvement in his lifestyle.87  They inflamed public outcry by 
publicizing anecdotes, such as the deadbeat dad driving a Mercedes-
Benz while his children starved.88  As we have seen above, they also 
used unreliable statistics to make their case.89  The proponents of 
stronger child support enforcement laws have been largely successful at 
painting the deadbeat dad as one of “the worst type[s] of villain.”90  
Some states even have a “most wanted list” for deadbeat dads.91
1.  The Enforcement Rationale: Going After Dad 
Increasing child support delinquency coincided with the rise of 
modern political conservatism in American politics.  Some credit former 
President Gerald Ford for changing the focus of the child support debate 
away from providing support to the mother and child and more toward 
actively pursuing the deadbeat dad.92  Conservatives were greatly 
concerned about the increase in welfare budgets and considered the rise 
 
support obligations”); see also BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 78-80 
(discussing that weapons used against the deadbeat dad include wage garnishments, 
interceptions of income tax refunds, and liens on their property). 
 86. See Andrea W. Fancher, Thinking Outside The Box—A Constitutional Analysis 
of the Option to Choose Between Jail and Procreation, 19 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 328 
(2006) (discussing the constitutionality of offering defendants who are significantly 
behind in their child support payments the option of going to jail or having a 
vasectomy).  The article concludes that under a strict constitutional analysis standard, 
the vasectomy option would not pass constitutional muster; however, a lesser 
standard—the reasonable standard—should be applied and under this standard, the 
option would pass constitutional muster. See id. at 346. 
 87. See DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD 
SUPPORT 48-49 (1979) [hereinafter DAVID CHAMBERS] (“By separating himself from 
his family and hoarding all income to himself, the father improves his standard of living 
dramatically.”). 
 88. See OOMS & WEINREB, supra note 13, at 9. 
 89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 90. William S. Comanor, Preface to WILLIAM S. COMANOR, THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS xv, xv (William S. Comanor ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter Comanor, Preface]. 
 91. See Henry, supra note 15, at 131-32 (listing a number of parents whose 
professions do not provide good remuneration such as bricklayers, pipefitters, 
carpenters, mechanics, taxi drivers, etc.). 
 92. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 95. 
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in the number of deadbeat dads to be a direct result of the 
“permissiveness” of the system.93  They charged that Aid to Families 
and Dependent Children (“AFDC”) rules simply permitted fathers to 
walk away from their obligations.94  It also did not help that by the 
1970s, social workers no longer controlled the welfare and child support 
agendas.95
Conservatives are right in several respects, notably with regard to 
their focus on the absentee father, but also by pointing out the link 
between child poverty—welfare—and broken families.  First, the parent 
overwhelmingly most likely to fail to pay child support is the father.96  
The overall rate of noncompliance with child support can be more than 
50%.97  The dollar amount of this delinquency totals about $4 billion 
annually and an accumulated $34 billion as of 2000.98  Indeed, 
providing federal aid to the mother and child does create a disincentive 
for the father to pay,99 though cutting aid is not called for by either side 
of the aisle.  Second, a correlation exists between child poverty and the 
single-parent household.100  A 1995 survey revealed that only 33.1% of 
black children lived in a two-parent household, compared to 75.9% of 
white children.101  This same survey found that 16.2% of white children 
 93. Id. at 103. 
 94. See id. at 104. 
 95. Id. at 125. 
 96. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 108.  According to a survey, up to 
97% of delinquent parents are fathers. Id.  There are a number of reasons why fathers 
fail to make their child support payments, including inability to pay, belief that they are 
paying too much, seeking revenge against their ex-spouses, and simply being 
irresponsible. Id. at 109-12. 
 97. See Henry, supra note 15, at 140 (stating that “child support compliance was 
only 44.5% where neither joint custody nor access were protected by an order”).  There 
is widespread unhappiness with the current child support system.  For example, “a 1996 
survey of Florida judges, hearing officers and special masters . . . found that one half of 
those charged with ordering guideline child support thought the guidelines were unfair.  
Of that half, 79% felt the guidelines treated the non-custodial parents unfairly.” Robert 
A. McNeely & Cynthia A. McNeely, Hopelessly Defective: An Examination of the 
Assumptions Underlying Current Child Support Guidelines, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 160, 160 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004). 
 98. SPENCE, supra note 9, at xv; see also CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 17. 
 99. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 104.  “AFDC rules did not require fathers to 
support their children if the mother claimed ignorance concerning who or where he was.  
Fathers could, thus, simply walk away from their children with impunity.” Id. 
 100. See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 34, at 15-17. 
 101. Id. at 15. 
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lived in poverty compared to 41.9% of black children.102  To many, the 
socially and fiscally responsible approach to the problem was to key in 
on the fathers. 
2.  A Moment for Pause 
What if the Mercedes-Benz stories were not true?  A growing 
contingent of father’s rights groups paint a pathetic figure that markedly 
contrasts with the caricature of the “deadbeat dad” living the high life at 
the expense of his children.  These groups point to statistics indicating 
that the custodial parent often has a higher standard of living than the 
non-custodial parent.103  In part, the standard of living discrepancy is 
attributed to custodial parents who use solely support money for their 
children without supplementing it with their own income.104  Thus, the 
counter-narrative is written, telling of pitiful fathers living in “a room 
furnished in early salvation army, an unmade bed, a bare bulb, a john 
down the hall, and a lonely man choking down meals of crackers and 
cheese.”105  Fathers’ advocates argue that the “deadbeat dad” is largely a 
myth and that the reality is that a lot of fathers are simply “dead 
broke.”106  In short, they are claiming that the “country’s monomaniacal 
 
 102. Id. at 17. 
 103. See Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 11; R. Mark Rogers 
& Donald J. Bieniewicz, Child Support Guidelines: Underlying Methodologies, 
Assumptions, and the Impact on Standard of Living, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 60, 61 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004).  In a 1998 study, 
conducted for the Urban Institute by Laura Wheaton and Elaine Sorenson, it was found 
that, in order to maintain his lifestyle after paying child support and taxes, a non-
custodial parent would have to earn 50% more income in the case of one child and 
100% more income in the case of two children. Henry, supra note 15, at 137.  
Unreasonably high support payments also result in a “hidden alimony” for the non-
custodial parent even when the custodial parent earns significantly more. See Sweat v. 
Sweat, No. 2000 C 127 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2002), rev’d on appeal, Ga. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. Sweat, 276 Ga. 627, 580 S.E. 2d 206 (2003). 
 104. See Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 20.  Economist 
Robert Willis suggests that an “overly generous system of child support payments 
would create an incentive for divorce by the custodial mother.” Id. at 21.  Thus, such 
provisions may end up hurting children even though their intention was to the contrary. 
Id. 
 105. DAVID CHAMBERS, supra note 87, at 74. 
 106. See Henry, supra note 15, at 137.  According to a 1992 GAO report, about 66% 
of deadbeat dads cannot afford to pay their child support obligations. See DAVID L. 
BENDER, CHILD WELFARE: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 75 (1998).  As to be expected in the 
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zeal to catch and punish ‘deadbeat dads’ produced an inherently 
inequitable and unjust [system],”107 that does nothing more than “[rob] 
Peter to pay Paul.”108
3.  Is There a Middle Ground? 
The truth might be somewhere in the middle.  Taxpayers should not 
have to foot the bill for fathers who simply refuse to pay their bills.  This 
should not be seen as a conservative position, simply a reasonable one.  
On the other hand, as we will see later, criminalizing this behavior and 
spending billions of dollars has not produced the desired results.  We 
should, therefore, look at the reasons why responsible men become 
deadbeat dads and we should not blindly follow reactionary measures. 
One of the major reasons for a man to become a deadbeat dad is the 
high amount of child support he is forced to pay.  In some instances, 
child support payments and taxes amount to 44% of the father’s 
income.109  This puts him in an untenable situation, and should he have a 
second family, they too are adversely affected.110  The father, thus, has 
to choose between paying beyond his reasonable means, and not paying 
at all.111  More idiosyncratic rationales for non-payment of support 
include feelings of being wronged by his previous partner, or that if by 
paying child support, he tacitly acknowledges responsibility for the 
failed marriage.112  In certain situations, some men approach marriage 
and child support as tantamount to a quid pro quo arrangement in which 
the husband and father financially supports his wife and children in 
exchange for the wife’s maintenance of the household and domestic 
 
lower economic echelon, some fathers simply cannot afford to pay their child support 
payments. BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at xi. 
 107. CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 162. 
 108. Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 22, at 4. 
 109. McNeely & McNeely, supra note 97, at 173. 
 110. See Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 22, at 4.  According to noted 
commentator Irwin Garfinkel, strong enforcement of child support laws will impoverish 
the father’s new family. See id.  In fact, everyone will be worse off by stronger 
enforcement—the father’s first family, his current family; even the government will 
collect fewer taxes as the father is forced into the underground economy. See id. 
 111. CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 29.  According to another commentator, 
when the father has to pay more than is reasonable, his child support obligation has 
“exceed[ed] his willingness to pay.” See Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra 
note 7, at 10. 
 112. See DAVID CHAMBERS, supra note 89, at 73. 
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companionship.  Once this bond is broken, the divorced man sees no 
reason to continue supporting his children.113  Still, other men withhold 
support of their children to take revenge on their former spouses.114
In sum, there are many reasons why a man could become a 
deadbeat dad.  We should recognize this fact and also recognize that the 
war on the deadbeat dad is not working.  As we will see later, casualties 
of this war include the father and his children.115  It is not idle 
speculation to suggest that, without negative consequences, some men 
might never pay their child support.  We should, therefore, keep the 
stick but also provide a carrot to the deadbeat dad. 
C.  The Stick Approach—Pros and Cons 
Alimony payments are deductible by the payor spouse and 
includible in the payee’s income.116  The reason for the deduction grew 
out of concern that the payor spouse would not be able to make these 
payments due to the high rates of the federal income tax during World 
War II.117  While income tax rates have considerably decreased,118 the 
favorable tax treatment of alimony payments has remained.  Regarding 
child support payments, such a holistic approach has never been taken.  
The non-custodial parent is seen as responsible for the economic well-
being of his children, and this responsibility does not end when he 
leaves the home.  The enormity of child support delinquency, and 
corresponding governmental efforts to remedy the problem, resulted in 
the criminalization of the child support system.119  This can be 
considered a war on the deadbeat dad and very little incentive has been 
given to encourage him to pay his child support; he is only offered a 
 113. See id. at 74. 
 114. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 111. 
 115. See Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 22, at 4.  One of the consequences of 
the war is the disincentive for the deadbeat dad to remarry. See id.  This means that the 
deadbeat will not get the benefits of marriage such as greater longevity, lower alcohol 
consumption and higher earnings. Id.  The two-parent household may be considered the 
best child support enforcement program because the resources of both parents will be 
available to provide for the child. Henry, supra note 15, at 145. 
 116. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 215 (2000). 
 117. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 322 (discussing that post World War II, marginal 
tax rates were as high as 91%). 
 118. See I.R.C. § 1 (2007) (indicating that the maximum marginal tax rate is 39.6%). 
 119. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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stick.  The yearly costs of the OCSE are estimated at $3 billion.120  
Despite massive expense, evidence is mounting that little progress has 
been made.121  The GAO’s estimate that up to 66% of non-custodial 
parents simply cannot afford to pay is an indication of why success is 
slow in coming.122
In addition to being ineffective in making the father pay, the stick 
approach has other negative consequences.  For very poor men, the cost 
of collection is often more than what is owed.123  Additionally, stronger 
enforcement efforts force more men into the underground economy, 
with the resulting loss of taxes for the government.124  Such efforts also 
discourage second marriages and take away the benefits of marriage for 
men, such as decreased mortality, higher income, and lower alcohol 
abuse.125  The very purpose of stronger child support enforcement by the 
federal government—that is, to increase child support payments—has 
been questioned, because in actuality the government spends more 
money on collection efforts than it collects.126  In sum, stronger 
enforcement efforts do not benefit children and may even leave them 
worse off.127  A contrary argument is that fathers who pay more tend to 
have more contact with their children—which is a good thing.128  The 
 120. See Robert I. Lerman & Elaine Sorensen, Child Support: Interactions Between 
Private and Public Transfers 45 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8199, 
2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8199. 
 121. Henry, supra note 15, at 129 (questioning the effectiveness of the child support 
collections system and arguing that it is not cost effective); Garfinkel, Introduction, 
supra note 22, at 3 (arguing that after more than “twenty years of increasingly strong 
legislation, child support collections, on average, have not shown much improvement”); 
Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 196 (same); Lerman & Sorensen, supra note 120, at 16 
(stating that between 1978 and 1997, the percentage of custodial mothers who received 
child support increased only from 35% to 36%). 
 122. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 123. Irwin Garfinkel et al., Conclusion to FATHERS UNDER FIRE 331, 335 (Garfinkel 
et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Garfinkel, Conclusion]. 
 124. Garfinkel, Introduction, supra note 22, at 4. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Garfinkel, Conclusion, supra note 123, at 335.  For fiscal year 1993, 
administrative costs of the AFDC on child support collection efforts exceeded 
collections by $278 million.  SPENCE, supra note 9, at xv. 
 127. Garfinkel, Conclusion, supra note 123, at 333; Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra 
note 31, at 226 (stating that some find greater enforcement leads to increased parental 
conflict, which decreases the overall well-being of the child). 
 128. See Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra note 31, at 228; see also BOUMIL & 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at x (stating that “a parent who is able to maintain a 
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trick is to create an environment where men will be more willing to pay 
their child support obligations.  One way to do this is to ensure that child 
support payments go to the children, as opposed to their mothers.129  
Fathers who are suspicious that some of the money does not go to the 
child might be right: An estimated $1 out of every $5 of child support is 
actually spent on the child.130  Additionally, in some cases, the custodial 
parent can end up having twice the spending money as the non-custodial 
parent.131  The system does not make sense because if the child is treated 
as an economic good, the deadbeat dad bears the burden of paying for 
the good (child support) and gets no benefit of that good (living with the 
child).132
Clearly, the deadbeat dad is wrong for refusing to pay his child 
support payments.  He should get no sympathy for that.  Nevertheless, 
we have seen that simply punishing the deadbeat dad does not work.  
We need to offer an incentive to the deadbeat dad.  For example, we 
should permit a deduction for the payment of child support. 
III.  PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
A.  Review of Previous Proposals 
The majority of the many proposals that address the deadbeat dad 
problem state that the federal government is an essential part of the 
solution.  The solutions range from providing tax deductions133 or tax 
meaningful relationship with his children is simply more likely to keep up with his 
financial obligations”). 
 129. Cf. Robert J. Willis, Child Support and the Problem of Economic Incentives, in 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 31, 47 (William S. Comanor 
ed., 2004).  A young father facing steep child support payments came up with the idea 
of having a credit card system that can only be used for items the child needs. See id.  
This would ensure that child support payments only went toward the needs of the child, 
not the mother’s.  See id.  Researchers say that if the correct matching rate is chosen, 
custodial mothers “will be motivated to choose an efficient level of child expenditure 
that reflects [the father’s] interest in the child welfare.” Id. 
 130. Comanor, Preface, supra note 90, at xvi (pointing out that this is an effective 
tax rate of 400%). 
 131. Sanford L. Braver & David Stockburger, Child Support Guidelines and Equal 
Living Standards, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 91, 93 
(William S. Comanor ed., 2004). 
 132. Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 26-27. 
 133. See Schenk, supra note 35, at 162 (stating that a child support payment should 
be treated as alimony so it is deductible). 
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credits,134 to treating the incident of single parenthood as a covered 
incident under the social security system,135 to providing an assurance 
program for children in case child support payments are not 
forthcoming.136
1.  Adoption of New Social Programs 
The last two aforementioned proposals do not appear feasible at this 
time given the country’s aversion to new entitlements.  Moreover, the 
United States already has a number of programs addressing child 
welfare.137  It is not clear whether the proponents of the new programs 
are advocating their programs as replacements, or simply additional 
programs.  Skepticism regarding such a program is well-founded as it is 
tantamount to making the public foot the bill of the deadbeat dad, and 
should not be done except in situations where the deadbeat dad is 
incapable of making his child support payments. 
2.  Deduction and Credit Proposal 
One proposed solution taxes the recipient on both alimony and 
child support payments.138  This proposal would allow private ordering 
by treating any payments to an ex-spouse as alimony unless the parties 
agree otherwise.  Thus, the parties can either make the payments 
nondeductible/nontaxable or deductible/includable.  Currently, taxpayers 
can agree to treat payments that qualify as alimony payments as non-
 
 134. See Shaller, supra note 35 (describing that there should be a limited credit for 
child support payments). 
 135. See GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 9. 
 136. See Garfinkel, What Have We Learned, supra note 35, at 4 (stating a new child 
support assurance system is the most comprehensive proposal for reform); Daniel 
Meyer et al., Who Should be Eligible for an Assured Child Support Benefit, in CHILD 
SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 175, 176-77 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994) 
(describing an assured benefit program that would protect eligible families against the 
insecurity that comes from irregular or late child support payments). 
 137. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 323 n.13 (stating that alimony deduction repeals 
were unsuccessful). 
 138. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 363 (stating that recipient’s of alimony and child 
support should be taxed); Schenk, supra note 35, at 162 (stating that the author would 
allow a deduction/inclusion approach unless the parties agree otherwise); see also Marci 
Kelly, Calling a Spade a Club: The Failure of Matrimonial Tax Reform, 44 TAX LAW. 
787, 810-11 (1991) (explaining that taxing the recipient for alimony and child support 
removes the incentive for taxpayer manipulation). 
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alimony payments.  This option would permit taxpayers to do the 
reverse.139  Proponents assert that it would make tax arbitrage less 
common in the divorce setting, soften the blow of the IRS, and simplify 
the tax system.140  The proposal has several flaws, however.  First, the 
private ordering would create new opportunities for the wealthy to 
realize tax savings.141  Second, the proposal fails to address the 
treatment of child support payments in non-divorce cases. 
The credit proposal, by creating a tax incentive for the payor of 
child support, is similar to the deduction proposal.  It recognizes that tax 
rate manipulation would be the best way to achieve its objectives.142  
Here, child support and alimony payments received by the recipient 
would be taxable even if such payments exceed the amount of credit that 
can be claimed by the payor.143  The proposed credit would be computed 
at the 15% rate on the sum of alimony and child support for up to 
$15,000.  This would be a change from current law which imposes 
almost no restriction on alimony payments so long as the definitional 
requirements are satisfied.144
The credit proposal purports to benefit all taxpayers at the same rate 
without regard to the individual’s tax bracket.  The full proposal also 
advocates for a limited exclusion for low income recipients of child 
support and alimony, or a lower income tax bracket for low income 
individuals.145  Yet, in addition to the complicated manner in which this 
solution attempts to protect the low income taxpayer by placing the tax 
burden on the higher income taxpayer, the major flaw in this proposal is 
that it, too, fails to address the non-divorce context. 
 139. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 363. 
 140. See id. at 377-82 (explaining the benefits of taxing a child support and alimony 
payment recipient). 
 141. The proposal would essentially render the rules under § 71(f) ineffective and 
would create opportunities to disguise property settlements as alimony; mainly 
benefiting wealthy taxpayers.  Taxpayers will normally enter into private ordering or 
tax arbitrage only when it benefits them economically.  Those with higher income are 
subject to higher tax rates and, thus, have the most to gain from tax arbitrage. See, e.g., 
Looney, supra note 39, at 6-7. 
 142. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 341 (stating that lowering tax rates could be the 
ideal tax relief for low income individuals). 
 143. See id. at 337 n.85. 
 144. See I.R.C. § 71(a), (f) (2000). 
 145. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 338 (“A limited exclusion section could be 
enacted for low-income recipients of child support and alimony . . . .”). 
236 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF  Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
B.  A Proposal for Fair Child Support Laws 
 
1.  Setting Realistic Child Support Awards 
Before changes to the federal tax code can be truly effective, state 
legislatures must enact reasonable child support guidelines.  This Article 
examines two disparate examples—Maryland and Massachusetts—in 
order to illustrate the point.  Maryland’s rules are an example of sensible 
child support guidelines.  Massachusetts’s are not. 
Under the Maryland statute, a non-custodial parent of one child 
who makes $60,000 would be liable for a basic child support payment of 
$520 per month if the custodial parent also makes the same income.146  
On the other hand, in Massachusetts, under similar facts, the non-
custodial parent is required to pay more than twice this payment.147  It is 
no wonder that Bobby Brown could not keep up with his Massachusetts 
child support payments.148  Perhaps adding insult to injury, an expensive 
child support payment often causes the custodial parent to maintain a 
higher standard of living than the non-custodial parent.149
The Maryland statute is an attempt to hold both parents liable for 
the support of the child.  The Maryland statute strikes a balance between 
the need of the child and the ability of the non-custodial parent to pay, 
with the need of the child taking center stage, as it should.150  This is 
very important because unrealistic child support awards result in 
excessive payments and delinquent fathers.  In addition, the statute 
 
 146. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(e) (West 2007) (summarizing 
Maryland’s calculation of child support).  Other factors impact this calculation, 
including the amount of time the child spends with each parent.  The current calculation 
assumes that the child spends all of her time with the custodial parent. 
 147. See MASS. ANN. LAWS CONSOLIDATION OF CASES CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, 
§ III(A) (LexisNexis 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelin 
es/csg2006.html.  According to the Massachusetts guidelines, the parent would have to 
pay child support in the amount of $167 plus 25% of the parent’s monthly income, for 
an amount of $1217. 
 148. See Brown Arrested, supra note 1. 
 149. See Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 11. 
 150. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(e).  First, the Maryland statute 
provides a table listing the amount of money both parents will be presumed to spend on 
their children.  This amount fluctuates with the income of the parents.  As the amount of 
parental income increases, the amount of child support payments rises also but not 
proportionally.  For example, an increase in parental income of 11.11% (from $9000 
per month to $10,000) will only produce an increase of 5.5% in child support payment 
(from $989 to $1040). See id. 
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imposes a child support obligation on non-working parents who are 
unemployed due to “voluntary impoverishment.”151  The Maryland 
statute strikes the right balance between the needs of children and the 
ability of parents to pay child support.  Coupled with a tax incentive to 
the payor, this set of circumstances would go a long way to eliminating 
the “deadbeat dad” from our lexicon. 
The Massachusetts guidelines, by contrast, award child support 
based upon the parent’s income.152  This distorted focus on the needs of 
children is a direct result of the “best interests of the child principle” 
imbedded in family law.153  By stipulating child support payments that 
can exceed a parent’s ability to pay, the Massachusetts law and 
corresponding guidelines fail to serve the best interests of the child.154  
In fact, a Georgia court specifically made such a finding regarding 
excessive child support payments because the non-custodial parent was 
not sufficiently able to provide for the children while in her care.155  In 
short, the percentage of income statutes shift the burden of child raising 
to the non-custodial parent without taking into account the ability to pay. 
 151. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b).  Under the statute, if a parent is 
voluntarily impoverished, child support payments are calculated based on the potential 
income of that parent.  A parent will be deemed to be voluntarily impoverished if the 
parent is not working, unless this is due to a physical or mental disability, or the parent 
is caring for a child under the age of two years, for which the parents are jointly and 
severally responsible. See id. 
 152. MASS. ANN. LAWS CONSOLIDATION OF CASES CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, § 
III(A) (LexisNexis 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelin 
es/csg2006.html. 
 153. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1A (LexisNexis 2007). 
It is hereby declared to be against the public policy of the commonwealth for a court 
of competent jurisdiction to enforce an agreement between parents if enforcement of 
the agreement prevents an adjustment or modification of a child support obligation 
when such adjustment or modification is required to ensure that the allocation of 
parental resources continues to be fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the 
child. 
Id. (emphasis added).
 154. See CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES § III(A); see also Shaller, supra note 35.  
Massachusetts is recognized as one of the states that has not struck a good balance 
between the non-custodial parent’s needs and his children’s needs.  The state simply 
requires the non-custodial parent to pay a percentage of his income in child support.  
See CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES § III(A).  As a result, in states like Massachusetts “the 
majority of custodial parents have higher standards of living than their matched non-
custodial parents.” Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 11. 
 155. See Sweat v. Sweat, No. 2000 C 127 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2002), rev’d on 
appeal, Ga. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Sweat, 276 Ga. 627, 580 S.E. 2d 206 (2003). 
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Guidelines should begin with a reasonable determination of the 
needs of children, followed by a determination of the economic 
standing156 of both parents, apportioning obligations based upon the 
proportionate percentage of such economic standing.  Ultimately, 
whatever scheme a state enacts, it must be based on strict economic 
analysis as required by federal mandate.157  This economic analysis 
should be premised on the notion that both parents are responsible for 
the care of their children and ought to pay a proportionate share of such 
costs based on their income.158  As part of the analysis, state-enacted 
guidelines should consider the large tax-related benefits that the 
custodial parent receives.159
2.  Proposed Legislation on Child Support Payments 
Section 71 of the I.R.C. is reproduced below to illustrate the change 
in the law advanced by this Article. 
 
Section 71—Alimony, and separate maintenance payments and 
child support payments. 
 (a) General rule.—Gross income includes amounts received as 
alimony or separate maintenance payments and child support 
payments. 
(b) Alimony or separate maintenance payments defined.—For 
purposes of this section— 
 (1) In general.—The term “alimony or separate maintenance 
payment” means any payment in cash if— 
  (A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse 
under a divorce or separation instrument,
  (B) the divorce or separation instrument does not designate 
such payment as a payment which is not includible in gross income 
under this section and not allowable as a deduction under section 215,
  (C) in the case of an individual legally separated from his 
 
 156. For this purpose, any type of economic benefit, such as receipt of a substantial 
gift, should be taken into account.  Basing child support payments strictly on income is, 
however, a reasonable solution. 
 157. See 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2000); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.55-.56. 
 158. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that any guideline discriminating 
against either parent would be found constitutionally defective). 
 159. Such benefits include head of household status, child exemptions, child tax 
credits, child care credits, and earned income credits. 
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spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the payee 
spouse and the payor spouse are not members of the same household at 
the time such payment is made, and
  (D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any 
period after the death of the payee spouse and there is no liability to 
make any payment (in cash or property) as a substitute for such 
payments after the death of the payee spouse.
 (2) Divorce or separation instrument.—The term “divorce or 
separation instrument” means— 
  (A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written 
instrument incident to such a decree,
  (B) a written separation agreement, or
  (C) a decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring a 
spouse to make payments for the support or maintenance of the other 
spouse.
(c) Payments to support children.— 
 (1) In general.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any 
payment which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in 
terms of an amount of money or a part of the payment) as a sum which 
is payable for the support of children of the payor spouse. 
The term child support payment means a payment that meets 
the requirements of local law.  Payments that exceed the guidelines 
under local law shall not be considered child support payments to 
the amount of such excess.  Child support payments shall be 
includible in the income of the payee and deductible by the payor. 
 (2) Treatment of certain reductions related to contingencies 
involving child. 
For purposes of paragraph (1), if any amount specified in the 
instrument will be reduced 
  (A) on the happening of a contingency specified in the 
instrument relating to a child (such as attaining a specific age, 
marrying, dying, leaving school, or a similar contingency), or 
  (B) at a time which can clearly be associated with a 
contingency of a kind specified in subparagraph (A), 
an amount equal to the amount of such reduction will be treated as 
an amount fixed as payable for the support of children of the payor 
spouse. 
 (3) Special rule where payment is less than amount specified in 
instrument 
For purposes of this subsection, if any payment is less than the 
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amount specified in the instrument, then so much of such payment as 
does not exceed the sum payable for support shall be considered a 
payment for such support. 
(d) Spouse.—For purposes of this section, the term “spouse” 
includes a former spouse. 
(e) Exception for joint returns.—This section and section 215 shall 
not apply if the spouses make a joint return with each other. 
(f) Recomputation where excess front-loading of alimony 
payments— 
 (1) In general.—If there are excess alimony payments160— 
 
*  *  * 
 
Section 71 would, thus, be streamlined.  The major complications 
of the section—the recapture rules—would remain.  Recapture rules for 
child support payments are not appropriate because the danger of excess 
child support payments is much less due to the longer duration of child 
support payments.  More importantly, the proposed language mandates 
consistency with local requirements.  Child support payments would 
have to meet applicable guidelines, meaning that like alimony, taxpayers 
would not be able to decide on an amount of child support.
Section 71(c)(2) and (3) would be excised due to the elimination of  
the distinction between child support and alimony, thereby rendering the 
priority given child support payments unnecessary.  While the 
distinction remains important for state purposes, it would not be 
appropriate for a federal statute to address this matter. 
IV.  OFFERING A CARROT TO THE DEADBEAT DAD: REVIEWING 
THE PROPOSAL 
 
A.  Is It Time to Make Peace with the Deadbeat Dad? 
The current system of penalizing deadbeat parents was born out of 
frustration regarding the ineffectual policies of the 1950s and 1960s.161  
 
 160. Section 71(f) and (g) should remain intact.  The concerns with respect to excess 
alimony payments are not as acute in the context of child support payments because 
such payments have to meet state law guidelines.  If a concern arises regarding disguise 
of property settlements as child support payments, application of § 71(f) can be made to 
child support payments simply by inserting “or child support payments” in § 71(f)(1). 
 161. See CROWLEY, supra note 12, at 29.  Conservatives were worried that the 
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Today we have to conclude that the penalty approach is not working 
either, but it does not mean we should resort to the previous 
unsuccessful approach.  Rather, it is time to change the paradigm by 
seeking to punish the truly deadbeat dad who refuses to pay, while at the 
same time offering an incentive to the dad who wants to pay but cannot. 
From an economic standpoint, the deadbeat dad has little positive 
incentive to pay his child support payments.162  Although paying child 
support is morally correct, the reality is that we cannot rely solely on 
morality to ensure that payments are made.  Some simply do not rise to 
this moral standard, whereas others justify their non-payment on wholly 
separate moral grounds.163  Hence, we need to make it economically 
rewarding for the deadbeat dad to pay his debts.  This is consistent with 
the general approach—providing tax breaks—that we take regarding 
behavior that we want to encourage.164  This approach is also bound to 
provide better success in changing the behavior of the deadbeat dad 
because a positive incentive would complement the current system, 
which provides only punishments for not paying one’s child support.165
There are many potentially positive consequences for including a 
carrot in this discussion.  The proposals calling for tax incentives to the 
deadbeat dad166 tend to limit their discussion to the tax code.167  There 
are, however, significant non-tax goals that should be taken into 
consideration.168  For example, the qualitative impact of child support 
“liberalization of welfare laws . . . was contributing to a . . . rising tendency of single 
mothers to rely on welfare for financial support in lieu of private support,” namely 
fathers of their children. Id. 
 162. Cf. Comanor, Review of Current Policies, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing a 
California rule, which “requires courts to adjust [child support] awards in relation to the 
amount of time spent with the child”). 
 163. See DAVID CHAMBERS, supra note 87, at 73 (accepting responsibility for the 
divorce). 
 164. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162-63 (2000) (permitting a deduction for business 
expenses and certain interest payments). 
 165. Cf. George K. Yin et al., Improving The Delivery of Benefits to the Working 
Poor: Proposals To Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX 
POL’Y 225, 287 (1994) (discussing that to reform the Earned Income Tax Credit 
program, certain incentives should be provided to employers and recognizing that 
“duties mandated by law without incentives could well prove counter productive”). 
 166. See generally Bigler, supra note 35 (discussing the possibility of child support 
payments being made tax deductible). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Klein, supra note 36, at 260 (indicating that in determining the tax 
treatment of child support payments, one must look at other issues relating to the 
242 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF  Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
payments in terms of things like the child’s earning potential and a 
general sense of “well-being” far outweighs income from other 
sources.169  Allowing a deduction is also bound to increase the amount 
and frequency of child support payments.170  Research has shown that 
this will positively impact children in two ways.  First, this will increase 
contact with their fathers because the dad who pays child support will 
also visit more.171  Second, when child support payments are made, they 
are a significant source of net income to the custodial parent.172
B.  Is the Proposal Good Law? 
Our income tax system is a voluntary system and will be obliterated 
if taxpayers refuse to comply.173  To the taxpayer caught in an IRS audit, 
the system might not seem so voluntary, but the reality is that the system 
“support of children” that would be “irrelevant to other tax disputes”); Jean T. Adams, 
Reconciling Family Law With Tax Policy: Untangling The Tax Treatment of Parental 
Trusts, 46 TAX L. REV. 107, 100 (1990) (examining the role trusts “play in the lives of 
the family members who create and enjoy them”). 
 169. See William S. Comanor & Llad Phillips, Family Structure and Child Support: 
What Matters for Youth Delinquency Rate?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD 
SUPPORT PAYMENTS 269, 271 (William S. Comanor ed., 2004).  It has been argued that 
every $1 of child support payment is worth $22 of income from other sources.  
Comanor & Phillips, supra at 271 (citing Sara S. McLanahan et al., Child Support 
Enforcement and Child Well-Being; Greater Security or Greater Conflict?, in CHILD 
SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 239, 249-50 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994)).  This 
is because by paying child support, the child benefits by “picking up some unobserved 
characteristics of the father, such as ‘family commitment’ or the fact that child support 
dollars have a symbolic value that enhances children’s well-being.” McLanahan et al., 
supra, at 250. 
 170. Cf. I.R.C. § 215 (2000) (stating that alimony payments are deductible from the 
payor’s gross income).  One of the reasons we do not have a “deadbeat ex-spouse” 
problem in this country is due to the deduction that the payor receives.  Despite such 
payments being made directly to a party with whom the payor spouse often no longer 
has a positive relationship, getting a deduction for such payments make things easier.  It 
is also true that alimony payments are normally for a shorter duration. 
 171. See Lerman & Sorensen, supra note 120, at 38.  Unfortunately, while the 
researchers report a positive correlation between child support payments and visitation, 
they also report a positive correlation between visitation and conflicts between parents.  
See id. at 39. 
 172. See id. at 19. 
 173. See Reginald Mombrun, Let’s Protect Our Economy and Democracy from 
Paris Hilton: The Case for Keeping the Estate Tax, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 61, 83 
(2007). 
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will grind to a halt if taxpayers refused to comply.  To ensure 
compliance, Congress has to ensure that the laws it passes are good laws 
and, thus, will be respected by taxpayers.  A good law must meet the 
following criteria: it must be equitable, efficient and simple.174  To be 
equitable a tax must affect similarly situated taxpayers in the same 
manner (horizontal equity), and disparately impact taxpayers that are not 
similarly situated (vertical equity).  The current system of child support 
taxation is not equitable because it can cause taxpayers having the same 
income to pay tax in vastly different amounts.175  Also, savvy taxpayers 
and those who have a collegial relationship with their ex-spouses or 
custodial parents might be able to pay fewer taxes by engaging in tax 
arbitrage.176  The current proposal would be more equitable than the 
current system because it would tax every taxpayer receiving child 
support payments and would reduce or eliminate tax arbitrage with 
regard to child support payments. 
A good tax is also an efficient tax.  An efficient tax interferes with 
economic behavior minimally.  Thus, “under a completely efficient 
system of taxation, a taxpayer’s behavior would be identical to that of a 
perfectly functioning market.”177  The concept of efficiency is closely 
related to neutrality.  A neutral tax would not affect taxpayer behavior.  
Some have argued that requiring that a tax be efficient is nonsensical 
because society needs government to function, which requires 
funding,178 meaning that any form of taxation imposed by the 
government would impact taxpayer behavior.  The current proposal is 
designed to affect the behavior of the deadbeat dad and is more 
economically efficient than the status quo because it would cause an 
increase in child support payments while taxing the party who receives 
the benefit of the income. 
Finally, a good tax is simple.  If a tax rule is complex, it naturally 
raises the costs of compliance.  Complexity is generally determined 
under the following three criteria: rule, compliance and transactional 
 174. See Viswanathan, supra note 38, at 668; see also Krisanne M. Schlachter, 
Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Will It Happen and How Will It Affect Our 
Progressive Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX. REV. 781, 792 (2000) (describing a good law as 
meeting four requirements: fairness, neutrality, efficiency, and simplicity). 
 175. See supra Part IV.C.4. 
 176. Viswanathan, supra note 38, at 668. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at n.79 (citing MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION 27 (5th ed. 2005)). 
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complexity.179  Rule complexity refers to the problems of understanding 
and interpreting the law; compliance complexity means the difficulty in 
complying with the law (forms, records etc.); and transactional 
complexity relates to the expense taxpayers undergo structuring their 
transaction to minimize the impact of the law.180  The revisions to § 71 
simplify the law by eliminating the different tax treatment of alimony 
and child support payments.181  The proposed rule would also cause a 
decrease in transactional costs.  It would make the taxation of divorce 
less complex, spurning savings by taxpayers, lawyers and the court 
system.182
C.  Arguments Against Deduction/Inclusion 
 
1.  The Tax Code Should Be Used Only For Economic or Fiscal 
Policy Reasons 
“The Rule of Law is, in the final analysis, nothing more or less than 
an orderly and equitable means for achieving society’s economic, 
political, social and moral objectives.”183  Despite philosophical 
disagreements respecting the use of the tax code to advance social ends, 
Congress “shows little appetite for ending the use of the tax system to 
enforce or encourage compliance with national objectives.”184  
Moreover, every deduction and credit provided by the tax code is 
arguably social engineering in furtherance of some type of direction that 
 
 179. See id. at 669. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 372-73.  The current law’s complexity is reflected 
by the difficulty courts have had deciding which types of payments are child support or 
alimony. See id. at 372. This is because sophisticated taxpayers could disguise property 
settlement as child support or alimony payments. See id. at 372-73. 
 182. See id. at 377-78. 
 183. Reginald Mombrun, The Relevance of Federal Income Tax Courses in the Law 
School Curriculum and in Law Practice: Now More Than Ever, 59 THE TAX LAW 1079, 
n.115 (quoting Letter from N. William Hines, President, Am. Ass’n of Law Schools, 
http://www.aals.org/am2006/theme.html). 
 184. See Schenk, supra note 35, at 148.  In addition to the tax system, Congress uses 
whatever tools it has at its disposal to achieve social ends. See Stephen Barr, Congress 
Weighs Using Nest Eggs as Agents of Change, WASH. POST, June 4, 2007, at D10.  For 
example, regarding the current genocide in Darfur, Congress is contemplating proposals 
to dissuade the Thrift Savings Plan (a $210 billion retirement savings plan) from 
investing in companies whose businesses in Sudan are deemed to directly or indirectly 
support the genocide in Darfur. See Barr, supra, at D10. 
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the government wants the country to take.185  Many taxes, such as “sin 
taxes” on tobacco and alcohol are forms of social engineering.186  If the 
power to tax is the power to destroy, then sin taxes are designed to help 
destroy the sin.  In short, social engineering through the tax code is 
pervasive and appropriate. 
The deductibility of alimony expenses under § 71 provides an 
analogy to the proposed child support deduction.187  Some argue that the 
alimony deduction lacks any policy or philosophical underpinnings.188  
This might be a fair criticism because other personal expenses, such as 
child support, for which there could be a more urgent policy 
justification, are not deductible.189  The reality remains that with respect 
to § 71, Congress made a determination that a particular constituency 
should enjoy this tax benefit.  The policy justification for Congress is to 
protect payees—usually women—by providing payors with incentives 
to make their payments.190  Such types of policy consideration are 
routinely entertained by Congress. 
 185. See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (14th ed. 2006). 
 186. See David J. Depippo, I’ll Take My Sin Taxes Unwrapped and Maximized, with 
a Side of Inelasticity, Please, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 545-49 (2002) (discussing 
history of “sin taxes”).  Justice Felix Frankfurter also recognized the social engineering 
aspects of taxes when he stated, “[A] tax can be a means for raising revenue, or a device 
for regulating conduct, or both.” See Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 105, 134 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 187. I.R.C. § 71 (2006). 
 188. See Lee A. Sheppard, Safe Harbor Divorce, 33 TAX NOTES 531 (1986) 
[hereinafter Sheppard, Safe Harbor Divorce] (describing § 71 as creating a safe harbor 
for the conversion of property settlement into deductible alimony).  Congress, in finding 
the line between property settlement and alimony, rejected a two-year alimony period 
because this would have allowed a payor to meet his two-year period by making a 
December payment followed one month later by a January payment, resembling a 
property settlement. Id. at 532.  Instead, Congress chose the current three-year payment 
scheme. Id. 
 189. See Lee A. Sheppard, Divorce In America Is Not So Simple, 23 TAX NOTES 
1014, 1016 (1984) [hereinafter Sheppard, Divorce in America]. 
 190. Cf. Shaller, supra note 35, at 323 n.13 (1994) (citing Marjorie A. O’Connell, 
The Domestic Relations Tax Reform Act: How We Got It and What We Can Do About 
It, 18 FAM. L.Q. 473, 494 (1985)) (stating that during the Reagan era, repeal of the 
alimony deduction was briefly considered but quickly dropped due to opposition by 
women’s groups, who believed that “elimination of the alimony deduction would be a 
disincentive to the alimony payor”). 
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The major problem with tax code social engineering is the staying 
power of government taxation edicts that eventually cost the government 
revenues beyond its original expectations.191  This Article’s proposal 
avoids this problem because it does not eliminate revenue, but rather 
shifts the tax burden to the correct party; in this case, the taxpayer who 
is also the custodial parent. 
2.  Shifting the Child Support Burden to Taxpayers 
It is hard to quantify the costs of the proposal.  Because the payor is 
normally in a higher tax bracket than the payee, the government might 
lose revenue on the resulting income shift.  This might facilitate tax 
savings to higher-income individuals, in addition to the so-called 
“divorce bonus.”192  There are fallacies inherent to this argument, 
however.  First, partly to the closing of the gender income gap, “the 
difference between the economic status of men and women after divorce 
is negligible.”193  Second, even if gender income disparities persist, the 
government’s loss is mitigated by the growing prevalence of joint 
custody where child support payments are lower and increasing grants of 
custody to the father.194  Third, the government would recognize 
significant savings when it becomes free of chasing the deadbeat dad.195  
Although higher income tax payers would recognize most of the tax 
savings from such a program, the lower income families, who are more 
likely to receive government benefits, will also benefit by the creation of 
an environment where more child support payments are made, a result 
sorely needed.196   
 
 191. See Viswanathan, supra note 38, at 674-76 (stating that the home mortgage 
interest deduction persists despite its ineffectiveness (as evidenced by the total revenue 
lost to the deduction, which is estimated to be over $100 billion, while home ownership 
has only increased from 63.4% to 68.9% over the past forty years)). 
 192. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 328.  A divorce bonus is recognized due to the 
shifting of income from a high bracket to a lower bracket. See id.  Additionally, the 
custodial parent also benefits by qualifying as a head of household. See id.  Shaller, 
however, fails to recognize that the divorced or unmarried couple does not benefit from 
the economy of scale enjoyed by married couples. 
 193. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 386. 
 194. See BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 11. 
 195. See Henry, supra note 15, at 128.  The cost savings of the government include 
amounts spent by the OCSE, in addition to enforcement costs incurred by the police and 
the court system. 
 196. See Looney, supra note 39, at 6 (child-related tax benefits sometimes do not 
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Additionally, there are already significant opportunities for 
arbitrage in the current system since taxpayers can swap higher child 
support payments for child deductions and credits, something that the 
IRS has recognized and respected.197  Therefore, the new proposal 
would not worsen the problem.  Finally, this solution will cost a lot less 
than proposals that have called for adding single parenthood as a social 
security benefit,198 or devising a new “child assurance” federal 
entitlement program.199
3.  The Proposal Will Create a Loophole for Wealthy Taxpayers 
Supporters of this argument rely on alimony statistics that indicate a 
majority of tax benefits are enjoyed by high income taxpayers. They cite 
to this evidence to suggest that the public will perceive this as another 
tax shelter for the rich.200  The dissimilar tax treatment of child support 
 
benefit poor families). 
 197. See, e.g., IRS form 8332, available at www.irs.gov (allowing the custodial 
parent who by law is entitled to claim the child dependency exemption to release such 
exemption to the non-custodial parent). 
 198. GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 9, at 51. 
 199. Ron Haskins, Losing Ground or Moving Ahead?, in ESCAPE FROM POVERTY: 
WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN 241, 266 (P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & 
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995).  It appears that the child support assurance program 
would be in addition to existing federal programs that provide help to children of the 
poor.  Proponents of the assurance system cite many differences from the traditional 
programs, such as the fact the assurance program would not just be for the poor; it 
would cover anyone entitled to receive child support.  Also, unlike the AFDC, the 
assurance program would not be a disincentive to work. Id. at 50.  It is questionable 
whether the public will have the stomach to handle what appears to be another costly 
federal program, in light of the myriad of programs already available to support 
children (the AFDC, the food stamp program, Medicare and Child Health, Housing 
programs, school lunch programs, WIC, Headstart, tax credits, etc.), and the amount of 
money spent on these programs ($131 billion in 1990 alone). See JANET M. CURRIE, 
WELFARE AND WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN 1 (2001). 
 200. Shaller, supra note 35, at 337. 
To illustrate, for 1990, although taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $100,000 or 
greater represented only a little more than 15% of the returns claiming an alimony 
deduction, the amount they deducted represented more than 36% of the alimony 
deductions claimed by all taxpayers.  Further, while taxpayers with incomes of 
$200,000 or more represented approximately 5% of the returns claiming the alimony 
deduction, they claimed approximately 20% of the total alimony deducted. 
Id. 
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and alimony payments is the source of many difficulties.201  There are 
significant differences between alimony and child support payments that 
would make sheltering of taxes through child support payments less 
likely.  The opportunity for disguised property settlements is lower in 
the child support area because child support installments tend to cover a 
longer period of time than do alimony payments.  Further, most states 
stipulate the minimum support payments based on the parent’s 
income,202  making it easier to monitor abuses. Moreover, § 71(f) of the 
IRC monitors excesses in alimony payments.203  The same concepts 
could be applied to child support payments.204
4.  A Deduction Will Lack Horizontal Equity 
Another argument against the deduction/inclusion proposal is that 
unmarried couples are favored over married couples.205  For example, a 
married couple with a yearly income of $80,000, who spends $10,000 on 
their child, will not receive a deduction for such expenses aside from the 
various child credits allowed by the code.206  But, if the couple divorces 
and the payor ex-spouse is allowed an overall deduction for child 
support, the divorced couple would get a deduction for all child related 
expenses that they could not deduct while married. 
This analysis is incorrect.  This proposal merely shifts income.  The 
couple will continue to pay income tax on their total earnings.  The sole 
modification is that the payee must report whatever income the payor 
 
 201. See Schenk, supra note 35, at 161-62 (describing that the differentiation 
between child support and alimony has created problems regarding earned income and 
child care credits); see also Bigler, supra note 35, at 337 (stating the distinction 
between alimony and child support is responsible for the complexity in the current 
taxation of divorce). 
 202. See SPENCE, supra note 9, at 10. 
 203. See I.R.C. § 71(f) (2000). 
 204. For example, one of the dangers in disguising property settlements into inflated 
alimony payments is that the payee spouse might argue for alimony at a later time based 
on this inflated amount.  The same can be true for inflated child support payments.  The 
payee also takes a risk in accepting delayed property settlement payments because the 
financial position of the payor could change over time. 
 205. Shaller, supra note 35, at 327-28 (stating that under the Revenue Act of 1969 
and the progressive rate structure, divorced persons who split income under current 
alimony provisions fare better than married couples). 
 206. Child Tax benefits include the child exemption, the child care deduction and 
the child tax credit. 
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can deduct.  If the proposal allowed a deduction without an inclusion in 
income, arguably, the divorced or unmarried couple would not be in a 
better financial position than the married couple.  The unmarried couple 
would incur duplicate expenses, such as separate homes, telephone 
services, utilities payments, car payments, insurance payments, health 
insurance, and gym memberships.207
The status quo lacks horizontal equity.208  Currently, the non-
custodial parent is the only party taxed on the income that is routed into 
child support payments.  Further, a taxpayer who receives child support 
payment is in a better position than a taxpayer who earns the same 
income but does not receive child support payments.209  For example, a 
taxpayer with a yearly income of $40,000, who does not receive child 
support, will be taxed on her entire income, while another taxpayer who 
makes $30,000 per year and receives $10,000 in child support payments 
will only be taxed on $30,000, effectively boosting her income by 
$1500—assuming they both pay a tax rate of 15%.210
5.  A Deduction/Inclusion System Would Create Hardships for Women 
Some argue that one of the negative aspects of the no-fault divorce 
laws is the loss of bargaining power for women.211  There is no incentive 
to negotiate prior to signing divorce papers.  The only bargaining chip 
for women is their control over child tax credits and deductions.212  
 
 207. Cf. I.R.C. § 1 (2000).  This is the problem with the notion of the so-called 
“marriage tax.”  Taxing married couples at a higher rate was not horizontally 
inequitable because married couples benefited from economies of scale, and, thus, 
could afford to pay more in taxes.  Nevertheless, the opponents of this marriage tax had 
a good story, a good slogan, and were able to change the law. See id. 
 208. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE 
AND POLICY 22 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the definition of horizontal equity). 
 209. Bigler, supra note 35, at 382 (“A taxpayer who receives payments as 
excludable child support is better off than a taxpayer with the same gross taxable 
income who does not receive such payments.”). 
 210. See id. (describing a similar scenario with two single mothers who have yearly 
incomes of $60,000). 
 211. See ANNE CASE ET AL., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., UNDERSTANDING CHILD 
SUPPORT TRENDS: ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 5 (2000), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8056 (stating that the switch to “no-fault” 
divorce in the 1970s reduced women’s bargaining power in divorce negotiations). 
 212. Parents are aware of such benefits and often exchange them for higher child 
support payments.  If the parties have two or more children, the bargaining is simpler as 
each party can split the tax benefits associated with children. 
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Therefore, the current proposal will significantly decrease or even 
terminate such arbitrage.  Although it appears that the custodial parent 
will not benefit from this system, negotiation is possible if the parties 
choose to do so.213  The custodial parent will continue to be entitled to 
the various child deductions and credits currently available.  More 
importantly, the custodial parent has an increased chance of actually 
receiving the child support due.  As discussed above, taxing the recipient 
would make the system horizontally equitable.214
Finally, some argue that women will be adversely affected by this 
model because they would bear the burden of taxes for child support 
payments.215  This analysis is faulty because most women216 are not 
receiving child support payments that are due, and increasing the flow of 
payments offsets any potential increase in tax. 
D.  Arguments In Favor of the Proposal 
In addition to the social benefits of the deduction/inclusion 
approach discussed above, the approach would benefit the tax system.  
There are three major benefits to the proposal: (1) tax simplification, (2) 
incentives to pay, and (3) income being taxed to the party who has 
dominion and control over the income.217  The first benefit is based on 
 213. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 380. 
For example, suppose that Jack and Jill are in the process of getting a divorce.  Jack, if 
single, would be in the 39.6% marginal rate bracket, and Jill would be in the 15% 
marginal rate bracket.  They are negotiating child support payments, and Jill would 
like $500 per month.  If the $500 were nondeductible by Jack and excludable by Jill, 
then Jill’s after-tax benefit would be $500.  Thus, $500 would be available for child 
support.  However, if the payments are deducible by Jack and includable by Jill, then 
Jack should be willing to agree to, say, a $600 payment, since the after-deduction cost 
of that payment would be approximately $360 ($500 x 40% = $240 deduction).  Jack 
is much better off under this approach.  However, Jill is better off as well.  The after 
tax benefit to her of $600 includable payment is $510 (600 x 15% = 90; 600 – 90 = 
510).  In sum, $510 would be available for child support. 
Id. (internal notations altered). 
 214. See supra Part IV.C.4 (stating that horizontal equity is a necessary component 
of the tax system). 
 215. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 364 (“[T]axing the recipient is unfair because it 
intensifies the economic hardship of women after divorce [and] is based upon empirical 
evidence that has been recently disproved.”). 
 216. See CAROLE CHAMBERS, supra note 3, at 17 (stating 75% to 87% of children do 
not receive child support payments); see also Bigler, supra note 35, at 379 (“Sixty-five 
percent of absent fathers do not contribute alimony or child support.”). 
 217. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 376-82 (stating tax simplification, elimination of 
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tax policy, the second benefit is based on public policy, and the third 
benefit rests on dual policy and technical grounds. 
1.  Tax Simplification 
The current income tax system has long been recognized as 
unnecessarily complex.218  Such complexity harms the economy because 
taxpayers, their attorneys, and the court system must wrestle with 
complex tax rules.219  One of the causes of tax complication is the 
differing treatment of items that should have the same treatment.  If 
preferential treatment is granted to one item over another, taxpayers 
would naturally attempt to identify their transactions with the lower tax 
option. 
The distinction between child support and alimony is the cause for 
much of the complexity.220  If alimony and child support payments are 
treated the same, most of § 71 definitional rules would be obsolete.221  
The current proposal provides unambiguous rules that would benefit the 
tax system, taxpayers, their attorneys, and the courts.222  In addition, the 
proposal would eliminate traps for the unwary.223  Under § 71(c)(2), 
child support payments take priority over alimony payments.  Thus, if a 
taxpayer makes a payment that is less than the combined alimony/child 
support that he owes, he has an incentive to adjust the child support 
 
traps for the unwary, elimination of taxpayer manipulation, incentives to pay child 
support, overall tax savings, payment as income to the recipient, and the application of 
the assignment of income doctrine are the benefits associated with a proposal that taxes 
the recipient on alimony and child support payments). 
 218. Id. at 372 (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISION OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 
715 (Comm. Print 1984)) (“[C]omplexity in some areas may be justified because the 
underlying transactions themselves are complex and the transactions are likely to be 
supervised by experts.  That is not [the case with] divorce.”). 
 219. See Bigler, supra note 35, at 378 (stating the current system has complex rules 
that require extensive court interpretation). 
 220. See id. at 337. 
 221. See id. (“Treating alimony and child support the same for tax purposes 
eliminates this complexity. . . . The complex definition rules of [§ 71] can be 
completely disregarded.”). 
 222. See id. at 377-78 (stating that the simplification of the system will benefit three 
main groups: taxpayers, attorneys and courts). 
 223. Id. at 378 (“The proposal also eliminates the traps for the unwary that plague 
the current system.  The exact language to differentiate the payments required by the 
current system is what traps many taxpayers.”). 
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portion downward and claim a higher alimony payment deduction.224  
For the payee taxpayer the reverse is true.  Therefore, the government is 
at the mercy of taxpayers classifying payments as alimony or as child 
support.  The revisions to § 71 eliminates the ambiguous code language 
that instigates this problem.225  In short, a deduction/inclusion rule 
would terminate taxpayer’s manipulation of the alimony/child support 
payment rules. 
2.  An Incentive to Pay 
Providing a financial incentive in the form of a tax deduction will 
encourage deadbeat dads to pay their child support obligations.226  Yet, 
it also creates an emotional incentive.  The government’s refusal to 
allow the father to deduct child support payments reinforces the feeling 
that his contributions are meaningless.227  If a father can deduct child 
support payments, he will feel that his contributions are valuable and 
necessary for his children.228  It is easy to speculate that over time this 
would increase societal pressure on men to pay their child support 
obligation and create an environment where payments are consistently 
made. 
It should be noted that the deduction for child support rests on 
stronger policy grounds than the deduction for alimony payments.229  
 
 224. See I.R.C. § 215(a) (2000). 
 225. Bigler, supra note 35, at 378 (“[T]here will no longer be the chance that one 
party will fail to report a payment (thinking it is child support) that the other party 
deducts (thinking it is alimony).  Both forms of payment will be includable and 
deductible.”). 
 226. See id. at 379 (stating that providing a financial incentive may encourage 
deadbeat dads to pay child support).  Payors should not need an incentive to support 
their own children; however, when the parents do not share the same household, the 
non-custodial parent, for a myriad of reasons, needs incentives to provide long term 
support to his children. 
 227. Id. (“By not allowing the father to deduct child support, it ‘reinforce[s] the 
already existing feeling that he is no longer regarded by the state as an important part of 
the child’s life, and that his contributions are meaningless.’”). 
 228. Id. (“The allowance of a deduction child support will allow the non-custodial 
parent to feel as if his contribution is valuable.  Such a simple change as allowing a tax 
deduction will allow a non-custodial father to support his children without 
discouragement or resentment.”). 
 229. See Sheppard, Divorce in America, supra note 189, at 1016 (stating that a tax 
break for child support has a greater public policy justification than an alimony 
deduction). 
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The high income tax rates that set the stage for alimony payment 
deductions have been lowered.230  Still, the deduction persists.  A 
deduction for child support payments should achieve the important 
policy of providing more money to custodial parents without unduly 
sacrificing revenue, and might have the ancillary benefits of promoting 
amicable relations between divorced couples while increasing contact 
between parent and child. 
3.  Taxing the Right Party 
Classifying child support payments as income to the recipient is 
necessary.  As it stands, the recipient obtains the funds tax-free and 
enjoys all available child tax deductions and credits.  Under assignment 
of income principles, the payor and payee are “arms’ length economic 
antagonists.”231  By not recognizing this, the IRC fails to recognize the 
economic implications of marriage and divorce.232
The problem might lie in viewing child support payments as solely 
a “personal, living or family expense.”233  As tautological as it might be, 
both child support and alimony payments are personal expenses because 
they are not business expenses under § 162 or expenses incurred in the 
production of income.234  Moreover, neither case law, nor the legislative 
histories of §§ 162, 212 and 262 adequately define “personal, living or 
family expenses.”235  Still, there are a number of code sections that 
 
 230. See Shaller, supra note 35, at 322 (explaining the history of the alimony 
deduction/inclusion provisions). 
 231. Id. at 381 (quoting Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: 
Carryover Basis and Assignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65, 108 (1988)). 
 232. See Schenk, supra note 35, at 164 (stating that despite the end of the marital 
relationship, the economic relationship continues and the taxation of earnings should 
not change). 
 233. See I.R.C. § 262 (2000); Schenk, supra note 35, at 163 (stating that child 
support is classified as a personal expense). 
 234. Schenk, supra note 35, at 163 (stating both child support and alimony expenses 
are personal).  There are four main approaches to determining whether an expense is a 
personal expense: (1) inherently personal expense such as fees for doctor visits, (2) 
excess costs (whether costs incurred by the taxpayer are job related), (3) whether 
expenses can be allocated between their business and personal components, and (4) 
whether an expense is primarily for business or profit-oriented activities. See BITTKER 
& LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 20.2.1, available at 
http://checkpoint.riag.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) (explaining that some business 
expenses that are inherently person are non-deductible). 
 235. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 234, at ¶ 20.2.1 n.10 (stating that the cases, 
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provide deductions for personal expenses,236 including alimony 
payments, despite the lack of any economic difference between alimony 
and child support.237  The rationale supporting the distinction is that 
while the marital relationship has ended, the non-custodial parent’s 
relationship with his children does not terminate.238
Absent the drafting of a deduction via “legislative grace,”239 there is 
another way to view the income-deduction conundrum.  Currently, child 
support payments are not recognized as taxable income to the payee.240  
In light of the provision of § 71 that excludes child support payments 
from the payee’s gross income because the payor may not take a 
deduction under § 215,241 the receipt of child support should be 
considered a taxable event.  Once a child support payment is made, the 
payor has little dominion or control over the payment.  He could hope 
that the money goes toward supporting his child, but this might not 
always be the case.  Thus, an argument can be made that, pursuant to § 
61, the recipient of support payments has accession to wealth and, 
therefore, income.242
rulings, and legislative history of  §§ 162, 212, and 262 fail to clarify the meaning of 
personal, living, or family expenses). 
 236. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 213 (2000) (deduction for medical expenses), see also id. § 
163 (deduction for certain interest payments). 
 237. Bigler, supra note 35, at 381 (“Child support and alimony should both be 
treated as under the control of the recipient since there is essentially no economic 
difference between child support and alimony payments.”). 
 238. Schenk, supra note 35, at 163 (“The Treasury Department and others have 
stated that alimony is deductible because the marital relationship has terminated and, 
thus, the payment is no longer personal.”); see also Louis Alan Talley, Tax Implications 
of Divorce: Treatment of Alimony, Child Support and the Child’s Personal Exemption 
(Cong. Res. Serv., RS 20004, Dec. 28, 1998); Bigler, supra note 35, at 382 (“One way 
to view child support is as payments made to a custodial parent to help fulfill her 
obligation of support to her children.”). 
 239. See Interstate Transit Lines v. CIR, 319 U.S. 590 (1943) (citing New Colonial 
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934)); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 
(1940) (“[A]n income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace . . . .”). But see 
Erwin N. Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be 
Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1142 
(1943) (stating the strict literal construction of tax statute’s rule that favored taxpayers 
was not rational). 
 240. See I.R.C. § 71(c) (2000). 
 241. See id. §§ 71, 215. 
 242. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining 
income as “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayers have complete dominion”).  To date, § 61 does not contain specific language 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The deadbeat dad phenomenon causes both short-term and long-
term social and economic problems.  In the short term, it is one of the 
causes of childhood poverty.  In the long term, it denies economic 
opportunities to children and deprives them of developing a bond with 
their fathers.  As argued above, a strong bond with parents is greatly 
beneficial to children.  As a society, we have advanced from ignoring 
the problem to attacking it, and neither approach has worked.  There are 
numerous reasons for this failure. 
We are faced with a quandary that we must resolve.  It is time for a 
new approach.  This new approach is the offering of a carrot to the 
deadbeat dad.  Along with the stick that we adopted in the 1980s, it is 
our best hope to erase the deadbeat dad from our lexicon. 
In this Article, I have argued that the current governmental 
approach to addressing the deadbeat dad problem is simply not working 
because the problem is worsening.  The Article has provided ample 
evidence of this worsening situation.  There are many reasons why a dad 
would refuse to pay his child support obligations, but the root cause of 
the problem is that the typical deadbeat dad feels that he has gotten the 
raw end of the deal.  That is, he is bearing the economic burden of child-
rearing while getting few of the benefits (i.e., actively participating in 
child-rearing).  Although some may argue that this feeling is not well-
grounded and is only a perception, as far as the deadbeat dad is 
concerned, this is reality.  If we want to change the current situation, we 
must change the perception of the deadbeat dad. 
This Article provides a three-prong approach to solving the 
problem: (1) set realistic child support payments, (2) provide a 
deduction for the payor of child support payments (payee will take 
payment into income), and (3) retain the penalties for failing to pay child 
support.  The purpose of the first two prongs of this approach is to create 
incentives for the deadbeat dad to pay his child support obligations 
because, often, he does not pay because he cannot afford to pay.  Setting 
realistic child support payments would go a long way to addressing 
ability to pay.  States such as Maryland have adopted a shared income 
model where both parents are responsible for the support of their 
children.  In addition to making payments by the non-custodial parent 
more affordable, such an approach is also seen as more equitable as it 
regarding income treatment for child support payments. See I.R.C. § 61 (2000). 
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puts the burden on both parents.  Coupled with the added deduction 
incentive, my proposal would create an environment where there will be 
little excuse for not paying child support obligations and, thus, societal 
pressure on the deadbeat dad to pay his obligations will increase.  The 
proposal recognizes that the proposed incentives will not work in all 
cases; hence, the current penalties for failing to pay child support 
obligations must be retained.   
To be sure, some will particularly oppose the second part of this 
proposal on many grounds but, as argued in this paper, the benefits of 
the deduction/inclusion approach outweigh its costs.  A particularly 
potent argument against the deduction/inclusion approach is that it will 
hurt mothers because the tax burden will be shifted to them.  This 
argument, however, fails to note that mothers that need the support 
payments, but do not receive them, will see an economic benefit by 
receiving regular payments regardless of the potential tax liability.  A 
by-product of increased child support payments will be increased 
visitations by dad and increased psychological benefits for the children. 
Finally, this Article provides proposed language to § 71 that would 
result in simplification of the section and easier administration by the 
IRS.  This proposed language should be embraced by tax simplification 
advocates.  Tax simplification would be achieved by the proposed 
changes giving similar treatment to both alimony and child support 
payments.  Hence, § 71(c)(2) would be entirely eliminated because the 
concern of disguising child support payments as alimony payments 
would no longer exist.  Moreover, child support payment would be 
defined according to state law with the result that the complicated rules 
under § 71(f) to guard against disguising non-deductible property 
settlements as deductible alimony payments would not spill over to the 
child support area, since state law zealously patrols the definition of 
child support. 
